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Abstract 
In the 1980s, six former southern republics of the USSR (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), like other former Soviet republics, traded 
very intensively both between themselves and with the other Soviet republics, but had a meagre 
volume of trade with the rest of the world. After the transition to the market, the deregulation of 
foreign trade, and the collapse of the USSR in the 1990s, trade between the former Soviet republics 
shrank dramatically and was only partially replaced by trade with other countries, mostly from 
Western Europe. In the 2000s and 2010s, the relative importance of trade with Western Europe 
has declined and the share of trade with China and other Asian countries has grown.  
 
This paper compares changes in the geographical structure of trade of both former Soviet 
republics (Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan) and Turkey, with the predictions of the gravity 
model. The gravity model suggests that trade between two countries is proportionate to their 
respective GDPs and is inversely related to the geographical distance between them.2 Turkey 
serves as a yardstick for comparison. For Turkey, changes in its geographical trade structure 
resulted from a rise in the proportion of trade with Asian countries and a decline in the proportion 
of trade with other regions in the world economy. In contrast, for the former Soviet republics there 
                                                          
1 This is a working paper at DOC Research Institute that was conducted for the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) on scenarios of agricultural development in Central Asia. The article can be found at 
https://doc-research.org/2018/09/geographical-structure-trade-central-asia/  
2 The Central Asian region, in accordance with the FAO classification, includes six former Soviet republics – 
Azerbaijan; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; and Uzbekistan – and Turkey.  
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was an additional reason for changes in their geographical trade structure: the collapse of trade 
within the former USSR.  
 
Introduction 
Tables 1 and 2 provide, to the best of our knowledge, the only available estimate () of the 
intensity of trade in republics of the former Soviet Union for 1989. Trade flows are represented in 
domestic prices and GDP data is estimated from official data on net material product, so the shares 
of trade in GDP for 1989 are not totally comparable with data for the 1990s and 2010s, but the 
general picture is so obvious as to not depend on data adjustment; former Soviet republics had a 
huge volume of trade with each other and a very modest amount of trade with the outside world.3 
‘Domestic’ trade represents trade among former Soviet republics and ‘foreign’ trade represents 
trade with the rest of the world. 
 
Table 1: Trade flows and trade balances for former Soviet republics, 1989, as a percentage 
of GNP 
Republics Trade flowsa             Trade balance 
 Domestic Foreign Domesticb Foreign Total, in do-
mestic prices 
Total in 
world prices 
USSR 21.11 8.27 -0.01(-0.14) -5.76 -5.78 0.21 
Russia 12.92 9.37 0.05 (0.02) -6.28 -6.23 5.76 
Ukraine 26.90 7.14 2.55 (-0.3) -4.61 -2.05 -2.04 
Belarus 44.56 7.39 11.14 (-1.6) -5.42 -5.72 -5.78 
Lithuania 47.26 7.21 -6.56 (4.0) -5.83 -12.39 -29.97 
Latvia 46.85 7.21 -1.03 (5.2) -6.18 -7.21 -13.39 
Estonia 50.11 8.79 -5.27 (5.3) -7.03 -12.31 -22.86 
Moldova 45.88 6.37 -1.87 (5.6) -7.86 -9.74 -24.34 
Armenia 47.85 5.84 -4.23 (-2.5) -9.70 -13.92 -17.40 
Georgia 37.88 5.90 1.98 (-4.9) -6.15 -4.17 -13.43 
Azerbaijan 35.38 5.95 13.89 (-2.6) -6.61 -7.28 -3.31 
                                                          
3 We refer to GDP throughout the paper, but due to the limited availability of data, percentages at this point in the 
paper are calculated on the basis of GNP.  
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Kazakhstan 29.48 4.69 -14.47(-1.3) -5.09 -19.56 -17.69 
Uzbekistan 34.10 5.62 -5.78 (-1.4) -0.59 -6.37 -8.71 
Turkmenistan 37.58 4.60 -1.53 (-3.0) -3.07 -4.60 0.00 
Kyrgyzstan 39.65 5.98 -7.21 (0.4) -10.24 -17.45 -15.86 
Tajikistan 37.70 6.01 -15.32 (3.0) -2.10 -17.42 -16.52 
Notes:  
a (Exports + Imports)/(2xGNP), at domestic prices, assuming the same GNP/NMP ratios for the republics as for the 
USSR as a whole. Domestic trade is trade with the rest of the USSR. Foreign trade is trade with the rest of the world. 
b Estimates of the balance of tourist trade are shown in brackets. 
Source: Commission of European Communities, 1990. 
 
This pattern changed dramatically in the 1990s. Trade within the former Soviet Union 
collapsed and began to be replaced by trade with other countries (see tables 2 and 3; also fig. 1), 
but the process was extremely slow, such that by 2016 total foreign trade as a percentage of GDP 
was still far lower than pre-transition levels of trade with other former Soviet republics and other 
foreign countries together. 
Tables 2 and 3 and figure 1 show the share of trade as a percentage of GDP at four different 
times. Evidently, the relative size of trade was reduced significantly in the beginning of the 1990s. 
This was due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of intra-
USSR trade flows in the early 1990s. Trade began to recover between 1996 and 2001, but today 
the share of trade in GDP is still considerably lower than in 1989.  
Table 2:  Trade as a percentage of GDP  
Country  1989 1996 2001 2016 
AZE 41.33 4.97 11.71 12.00 
KAZ 34.17 8.26 10.83 13.65 
KGZ 45.63 16.26 10.87 25.8 
TJK 43.71 8.87 10.33 16.52 
TKM 42.18 11.39 16.64 13.59 
TUR 25.55 17.61 12.27 17.7 
UZB 39.72 11.07 8.5 8.6 
Note: AZE: Azerbaijan; KAZ: Kazakhstan; KGZ: Kyrgyzstan; TJK: Tajikistan; TKM: Turkmenistan; TUR: Turkey; 
UZB: Uzbekistan 
Source: Commission of European Communities, 1990; WDI; COMTRADE.  
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Figure 1 shows changes in the share of actual trade in GDP in former Soviet republics and in 
Turkey over the period 1989-2016. Even though 1989 data is not totally comparable with the 
following years, the comparison is very telling. The share of foreign trade in GDP fell dramatically 
in the early 1990s and has not yet recovered to the old Soviet level. All former Soviet republics 
traded much more intensively in Soviet times – mostly among themselves. Today they trade mostly 
with other countries, but the relative size of this trade is way below the levels of trade reached 
during the era of the USSR. 
 
Table 3:  Breakdown of trade flows for Central Asian republics and for Turkey as a 
percentage of GDP (domestic refers to trade between the Central Asian countries, plus 
Russia, while foreign trade refers to US+EU+China+ rest of the world)4  
Country  
1989 1996 2001 2016 
domestic foreign  Total  domestic foreign domestic foreign 
AZE 35.38 5.95 4.97 2.26 9.45 2.13 9.87 
KAZ 29.48 4.69 8.26 4.41 6.42 3.74 9.91 
KGZ 39.65 5.98 16.26 5.02 5.85 11.04 14.77 
TJK 37.70 6.01 8.87 4.78 5.55 6.87 9.65 
TKM 37.58 4.60 11.39 2.97 13.66 3.23 10.36 
TUR 25.55 17.61 0.88 11.39 1.24 16.47 
UZB 34.10 5.62 11.07 2.83 5.67 3.02 5.58 
Note: AZE: Azerbaijan; KAZ: Kazakhstan; KGZ: Kyrgyzstan; TJK: Tajikistan; TKM: Turkmenistan; TUR: Turkey; 
UZB: Uzbekistan 
Source: Commission of European Communities, 1990; WDI; COMTRADE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 For 1989, domestic trade includes trade with other former Soviet republics as well (the three Baltic states, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia). For 2001 and 2016, domestic refers to trade between the 
Central Asian countries, including Turkey, plus Russia, while foreign trade refers to the US + the EU + China + the 
rest of the world. 
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Figure 1: Trade as a percentage of PPP GDP 
  
Source: Commission of European Communities, 1990; WDI; authors’ calculations. 
 
The model 
We use the gravity model of international trade, which incorporates both economic 
potential and distance as determinants of trade flow. The model was first introduced to economics 
by Isard (1954). Among other factors, the economic size of trading partners and trade resistance 
are crucial determinants of trade flows. Geographical resistance between countries is used as a 
proxy for trade resistance, so the formula for trade flows between two countries, i and j, is as 
follows:   
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 𝜏
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
𝛼 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗
𝛽
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝛾  
Where GDPi and GDPj are Gross Domestic Product for countries i and j;  𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the distance 
between the countries; and α, β, γ, and τ are parameters. 
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We make a very crude estimate by assuming all parameters are equal to 1 instead of 
estimating them from a regression equation. But this crude estimate is sufficient at this point to 
demonstrate the major discrepancies between predicted and actual trade patterns.    
 
Very often a dummy variable is introduced into gravity models to account for common 
culture, language, and history; landlocked status; and memberships in trading blocs and the WTO. 
Some of these factors (culture and language) have been taken into account in augmented gravity 
models by various scholars (e.g., Filippini and Molini, 2003).  
Landlocked status is an important consideration for Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan 
because all of them are landlocked. Conventional understandings of trade believe landlocked status 
harms development by reducing trade and the gravity model seems to confirm this opinion (see 
Carmignani, 2015). However, there is no evidence of a systematic relationship between landlocked 
status and the trade-to-GDP ratio. Switzerland and Austria are landlocked countries, but their 
trade-to-GDP ratios are very high. Carmignani explored the possibility that landlocked status 
might affect GDP independently. He suggested that landlocked status has a negative impact on 
GDP but that this impact is transmitted through institutions rather than through trade.  
The results from the study by Ariekot (2017) show that landlocked countries are negatively 
affected by the time taken by importing. However, these delays are only associated with a 0.19% 
decrease in trade.  
 
Data 
 In order to compute predicted trade, we used GDP at Purchasing Power Parity (GDP PPP). 
GDP at PPP is a good representative of the economic condition of the country as it does not 
incorporate the impact of the exchange rate.  
Data for distance between countries was taken from the CEPII, a French international 
economics research centre which produces research and data on the world economy; GDP data 
comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database; trade data was collected 
from the UN’s COMTRADE database.  
              The distance used in this report is the distance between the capital cities of trade 
counterparts. However, in order to estimate a distance between these economies and the rest of the 
world, we divided the world into six major locations; South America (represented by Brasilia, 
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Brazil); Europe (represented by Berlin, Germany); Africa (represented by N'Djamena, Chad); 
Australia and Oceania (represented by Canberra); East Asia (represented by Tokyo, Japan); and 
South Asia (represented by New Delhi, India), took the distances of the respective Central Asian 
countries from these locations, and divided the sum of these distances by six. To estimate the 
distances between the countries of Central Asia – for interregional trade – we added up the 
distances between each pair of Central Asian countries and then divided by six.  
 
Trends 
Comparing trade flows in 2001 and in 2016 shows that the relative volume of trade as a 
percentage of GDP remained almost the same, but the magnitude of trade changed. Trade with 
China has increased considerably in 2016, compared to 2001, partially at the expense of trade with 
the EU and partially at the expense of the rest of the world. This is in line with the implications of 
the gravity concept. It is not just that the Chinese economy is now the largest in the world, but also 
the fact that it has been growing faster in recent decades than most other countries and regions.  
Figure 2 depicts the predicted trade share vs actual trade share with different foreign trading 
partners for Turkey and Central Asian countries in 2001. It demonstrates that overall, Central 
Asian countries trade with Russia more than the gravity model predicts. This is also true with 
respect to trade between Central Asian countries themselves. Russia and Central Asian countries 
are considered to be ‘overtraded’ countries – where actual trade is higher than predicted – whereas 
China, the US, the EU, and the rest of the world are ‘under-traded’ regions for Central Asian 
countries. To be more precise, the EU was an under-traded region for all countries except for 
Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. And the rest of the world trade also traded less than would have been 
predicted with all the countries of Central Asia except for Turkmenistan and Turkey.   
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Figure 2: Predicted vs actual trade share with various regions as a percentage of total trade 
in 2001  
 
Overtraded countries: 
2001 
Under-traded countries: 
2001 
 Russia 
 Intra-Trade 
 
 China 
 US 
 EU 
 Rest of the world (ROW) 
Note: AZE: Azerbaijan; KAZ: Kazakhstan; KGZ: Kyrgyzstan; TJK: Tajikistan; TKM: Turkmenistan;  
TUR: Turkey; UZB: Uzbekistan 
Source: COMTRADE, WDI, CEPII, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Figure 3 presents predicted trade and actual trade for different regions as a percentage of 
total trade for 2016. Central Asian countries, except Turkey, traded with Russia more than the 
gravity model would have predicted. Intra-regional trade had a higher than predicted share of total 
trade for all countries. China traded less than the gravity model would have predicted with all 
countries except for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan; China’s trade with Kyrgyzstan was virtually 
equal to the level predicted. Trade with the US was lower than predicted for all countries of Central 
Asia, and trade with the EU was below the level predicted for all countries except for two oil rich 
economies, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Trade with the rest of the world was lower than predicted 
for most Central Asian countries except for Azerbaijan and Turkey.  
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Figure 3: Predicted vs actual trade share with various regions as a percentage of total trade 
in 2016  
 
Overtraded countries: 
2016 
Under-traded countries: 
2016 
 Russia 
 Intra-regional trade 
 
 China 
 US 
 EU 
 Rest of the world (ROW) 
Source: COMTRADE, WDI, CEPII, authors calculations. 
 
The overall 2016 geographical trade structure was more in line with what the gravity model 
would have predicted than the 2001 structure, but Russia and Central Asia were still overtraded 
regions, whereas China, the EU, the US and the rest of the world were under-traded.  
Trade with China increased considerably in 2016, compared to 2001, partially at the 
expense of trade with the EU and partially at the expense of trade with the rest of the world. This 
highlights the importance of China as a neighbouring country in the region and of the rapid growth 
of China’s GDP.  
 
Interpretation 
The greater-than-predicted trade between Russia and Central Asian countries, and between 
Central Asian countries themselves, has a natural explanation: that these countries all belonged to 
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the former Soviet Union and still have some common socio-cultural features and a common 
language, which obviously facilitate trade.  
In contrast, trade with the EU goes through Russia, creating customs-related problems in 
addition to the simple problem of remote distance. For trade with China, transportation facilities 
are scarce – roads and railways being hampered by difficult mountainous landscapes on one hand 
and a history of strained geopolitical relations between China and USSR since the late 1960s on 
the other hand. However, the new One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative aims to improve trade 
connectivity between China and Central Asian countries. Central Asia is bound to become one of 
the major transportation routes for Chinese trade with Europe and Middle East.   
An oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China and a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to China 
were recently completed. Khorgos Gateway, a dry port on the China-Kazakh border that is seen as 
a key cargo hub on the new Silk Road, began operations in August 2015. In December 2017, at 
the tripartite meeting between China, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, decisions were taken on the 
Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-China railway project. This project will shorten the route to China and 
provide access to the Middle East and to Europe through the Transcaucasian corridor. 
The Mazar-e-Sharif–Herat railway, which is a continuation of the existing Hairatan–
Mazar-e-Sharif rail line, connects Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Based on expert estimates, a direct 
railway link between the Iranian port of Chabahar and Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat could increase 
foreign trade turnover by almost 50% in Afghanistan which is a neighbouring country to Central 
Asia.5 By having access to the Iranian port of Chabahar, the railway will grant market access to 
India. In return, India will have access to Central Asia and the wider Eurasian region. Another 
railway development between the Iranian city of Khaf and Herat in Afghanistan is also expected 
to increase the volume of trade in the region.  
 
Conclusions 
For all countries considered, the geographical structure of trade changes in the direction of 
the structure predicted by the gravity model: less trade with Russia and Europe; more trade with 
China and Rest of the world. But this process is happening faster for former Soviet republics rather 
than for Turkey. For some of these countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan – trade with 
                                                          
5 Zilola Karimova of the Center for International Relations Studies, Tashkent, a body affiliated to Uzbekistan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, shares these statistics in The Diplomat (2018).  
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China was already close to one-third or over of total trade (between 29% and 49%) and was even 
higher than the predictions of the gravity model.  
This is probably explained by the fact that former Soviet republics, after experiencing the 
collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union, were less and still are less involved in international 
trade than other countries of the same size and level of development. Their trade-to-GDP ratios 
are similar to that of Turkey (fig. 1), which is a much bigger economy, whereas smaller countries 
normally have higher ratios for external trade-to-GDP. Unlike Turkey, which is restructuring its 
trade by finding new partners in China instead of old partners in Europe, former Soviet republics 
are building up their foreign trade from scratch, and, like in many other cases, building anew turns 
out to be easier than restructuring. The external trade of former Soviet republics will likely 
continue to grow at an accelerated pace, predominantly due to the expansion of trade with China 
and Asia.  
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